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Abstract 
The primary mission at NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) is rocket propulsion testing. 
Such testing is commonly characterized as one of two types: production testing for 
certification and acceptance of engine hardware, and developmental testing for prototype 
evaluation or research and development (R&D) purposes. 
For programmatic reasons there is a continuing need to assess and evaluate the test costs 
for the various types of test campaigns that involve liquid rocket propellant test articles.  
Presently, in fact, there is a critical need to provide guidance on what represents a best value 
for testing and provide some key economic insights for decision-makers within NASA and 
the test customers outside the Agency.  
Hence, selected rocket propulsion test databases and references have been evaluated and 
analyzed with the intent to discover correlations of technical information and test costs that 
could help produce more reliable and accurate cost projections in the future.  
The process of searching, collecting, and validating propulsion test cost information 
presented some unique obstacles which then led to a set of recommendations for 
improvement in order to facilitate future cost information gathering and analysis. 
In summary, this historical account and evaluation of rocket propulsion test cost 
information will enhance understanding of the various kinds of project cost information; 
identify certain trends of interest to the aerospace testing community.   
Nomenclature 
 
CDW     =Cost Data Warehouse 
DOD     =United Stated Department of Defense 
FY      =Fiscal year 
GG     =Gas Generator 
LRE     =Liquid Rocket Engine 
NASA     =National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
PB      =Preburner 
PPA     =Powerpack Assembly 
PRD     =Projects Requirement Document 
R
2
      =Regression Coefficient 
R&D     =Research and Development 
RPT     =Rocket Propulsion Test 
SAA     =Space Act Agreements 
SSC     =John C. Stennis Space Center 
STE     =Special Test Equipment 
TA      =Test Article 
TCA     =Thrust Chamber Assembly 
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I. Purpose 
he primary mission at NASA SSC is rocket propulsion testing. Such testing is often characterized as one 
of two types:  
1. production testing for certification and acceptance of flight liquid rocket engines (LRE), 
and  
2. developmental testing for prototype evaluation or R&D purposes. 
The traditional customer base for rocket testing consists of NASA, DOD, and commercial (non-government) 
programs/projects. Resources in place to perform on-site rocket testing include civil servants and contractor 
personnel, hardware and software including data acquisition and control across seven (7) test stands comprising a 
total of 11 test positions/cells.  For programmatic reasons there is a continuing need to survey and evaluate the test 
costs for the various types of test campaigns that involve liquid rocket propellant test articles.  Presently, in fact, 
there is a critical need to provide guidance on what represents a best value for testing and provide some key 
economic insights for decision-makers within NASA and the test customers outside the Agency.  
Hence, selected rocket propulsion test databases and references have been evaluated and analyzed with the 
intent to discover correlations of technical information with test costs; this could help produce more reliable and 
accurate cost projections in the future.   
II. Background and Context 
A. Chemical Propellant Rocket Test Capabilities 
Test facilities at SSC are comprised of three (3) rocket propulsion test complexes namely A, B, and E
1
 
complemented by engineering analysis and specialized laboratory services as well as specialized skills/crafts 
capacities. Test capabilities are for full scale launch vehicle stages, full scale rocket engines/motors, small and large 
scale engine components (pumps, preburners, gas generators, powerheads), and small to medium combustion 
devices. SSC is featured alongside the rest of NASA’s primary test capabilities at the official agency website for 
rocket testing (http://rockettest.nasa.gov/). Further details on test stands and projects have been discussed in prior 
conference papers (Taylor et al.
2
, Ryan et al.
3
, and Rahman et al.
4
) and are not repeated here.  
For the ensuing discussion, it is important to delineate at the outset that testing involves a substantial period of 
pre-test preparations (weeks to months, sometimes years), and a distinct period when the visible test campaign is 
actually accomplished which is generally much shorter. During the preparation period, several key long-lead items 
are procured in parallel to a detailed design effort that specifies the special test equipment (STE) to be used, builds it 
up and installs it, and conducts a formal pre-test “dress rehearsal” to ensure the proper test sequences and abort 
modes. As will be described in this paper, the accrual of test costs occurs substantially throughout the period, and 
not just during the relatively brief test campaign itself.   
B. Prior NASA SSC Testing Cost and Technical Evaluations  
Earlier work to analyze, explain and forecast propulsion test projects cost was performed by Savona et al.
5
 and 
focused on monthly and cumulative expenditure (both planned and actual) as a function of time. The time history 
charts thus derived for planned expenditure were driven by the financial cycle and budget planning milestones per 
projected funds availability. In contrast, the time history for actual expenditure reflected funds authorization and 
availability. The timeline charts for cumulative expenditure exhibited no common pattern. Mathematical correlations 
were explored for both actual and cumulative expenditure; however, the regression coefficient (R
2
) ranged widely 
from 0.05 to 0.99 suggesting only limited success. Visual inspection of the timeline charts and mathematical 
correlations when grouped by certain criteria (i.e., project years, test stand, and timeframe) produced no consistent 
pattern.  
In early 2002, Congiardo
6
 charted the cost estimates developed by NASA test engineers as preliminary 
estimates submitted to test customers. This study correlated the estimates against test stand, thrust level, STE 
complexity, test activity and so forth. Albeit cursory in nature, the review of over 30 estimates pointed out to thrust 
scale, STE complexity, and test activity amount as drivers of cost. 
A liquid rocket testing study
7
 described the uniqueness of several propulsion test projects and the overall steps 
taken to bring them to successful completion. A corner stone for rocket engine development was a sound risk 
mitigation strategy through phases of ground testing within reasonable cost and schedule constraints. Despite the 
specialized nature of propulsion R&D, all such projects undergo similar developmental stages of testing: subscale 
component test, full scale component test, “battleship” engine test, flight engine development test, flight engine 
T 
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qualification/certification/acceptance test, and flight stage qualification/acceptance test. Notably, all test projects in 
the above phases still share the essential common process steps: 1) test project formulation, 2) special test equipment 
design and engineering, 3) hardware and software modifications, 3) operational activities/test data reviews, 4) test 
final report and test article shipment, and 5) demobilization and project close out (and potential follow-on). Over 
time, as more test projects are completed, the test facilities/infrastructure/resources mature and become better 
equipped to serve the next project in line, thus reducing the amount of future investments to assure test success.  
C. Test Project Information Grouping 
 In order to construct a comprehensive historical timeline, including a given project’s costs and schedules, it 
was necessary to gather information from a variety of sources. The wide varieties of projects are also better 
understood if assembled into subsets of logical groupings. The initial guide for grouping was developed by Kirchner 
et al.
8
 In particular; a proposed grouping by test article type and its associated thrust-scale is given in Table 1 taken 
from the final report by Kirchner et al. Thrust-scale is given in brackets in most cases. The information includes 
canceled rocket test projects as well. The table excludes non-propulsion test activities. 
For the subsequent cost collection and evaluations, the charge codes associated with each project were identified. 
This charge code is the keystone for cost information collection, and in many occasions there exist multiple charge 
codes for a test project. The test project manager in collaboration with the team and customer determine how many 
codes are needed to effectively manage and control the project and its cost. The charge codes were gathered from 
the financial archives, both hard copy and electronic. Information was cross-checked and augmented by archives of 
legacy documents. 
The archive of legacy documents are comprised of agreements, project requirement documents, project 
presentations, reports to management, technical papers, and NASA SSC web site information. The search yielded 
additional information used to construct a table containing the following information: charge code(s), main project 
Table 1. Post-Apollo SSC propulsion test projects by test article, type and size (as of Dec. 31, 2004) 
 
 
< 1 Klbf < 10 Klbf < 100 Klbf < 1 Mlbf
Thrust Chamber 
(TCA) , or
Preb (PB), or Gas 
Gen (GG)
-- pressure-fed
• H2O2 Catbed
• Multi-series H2O2 
Catbed
• 10K H2O2/JP TCA 
• H2O2/JP TCA 
(10K)
• 10K LOX Hybrids
• 10K H2O2 Hybrids
• 60K LOX Hybrid 
• 75K LOX/RP TCA
• RS76 LOX/RP PB (30K)
• RS84 subscale PB (30K)
• RS84 subscale PB/MCC
• 650K LOX/LH TCA 
• 250K LOX Hybrid Motor 
• 400K O2/H2 PB 
(cancelled)
• 400K PB (400K -cancelled)
• 1 Mlbf LOX/RP 
Battleship PB (cancelled)
Pump (Cold) • MK67 (12K -cancelled)
• MB60 LH (60K-cancelled)
• 250K LOX [LN] 
• 250K LH 
Pump Hot-fire • 250K LOX Pump/PB 
Powerhead • 204K LOX/LH
• 250K LOX/LH
Engine • H2O2/JP engine 
(6K)
• 60K LOX/RP engine • 204K R&D Engine
• 204K R&D Dual-engine
• 700K Flight Engine
• SSME engine
Stage • 10K H2O2/JP Stage 
(halted)
• 60K LOX HybridStage
• 60K LOX/RP Stage
• Delta 4 Common Booster 
(1 RS68)
• MPTA (3 SSME engines)
 
Color key: DOD projects, blue text; commercial, red; and NASA, black. 
 
 
RELEASED - Printed documents may be obsolete; validate prior to use. 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
4 
identification, test stand, test objective, other known project names/codes/description, known project management 
succession, project status (canceled, completed, active), project successions, notes on test campaigns, and other 
ancillary relevant facts to complete the record. This table is called the “Business Infrastructure” table. Another table 
was created to associate the test stands to the test campaigns run on those test stands. Information grouping overall 
was done in consultation with project managers, engineering staff, and other official personnel. 
The Business Infrastructure table is the guide used to put together, in a timeline fashion, the schedule, test 
activity, and cost information for each project.  Thus, Table 1 along with project specific information provide the 
basis for cost evaluations that are presented in the results sections of this paper. 
III. Development of Test Projects Database 
Tests projects at NASA SSC include small, medium, and large scale test campaigns of various test project 
durations (i.e. months or years); the highly customized nature of the activities result in many tailored approaches to 
cost estimating, cost tracking, cost allocations and accrual processes. This was further complicated by ongoing 
changes in the financial systems as modernization of those systems and other bookkeeping practices evolved 
through automation, updates and/or adjustments.  
As a preamble to the discussion of test project costs, it is necessary to outline first how the test cost database 
was assembled for this study. 
A. Information Sources and Intermediate Databases 
Information used in this study was extracted and distilled from multiple sources, and cross-compared and 
compiled as needed. Specifically, the sources were:  
1) The NASA SSC Quarterly Resources Status Report of the organization’s Resources  
  Management Division (known locally as “The Blue Book”)  
2) Cost Data Warehouse (CDW), an Agency adopted business management tool 
3) Space Act Agreements (SAA) for NASA SSC’s external customers 
4) Requirement documents for the specific test campaigns 
5) Rocket Propulsion Test Management Board and Rocket Propulsion Test (RPT) website data on test 
capability
 
6) Performing organization’s monthly review reports, in the form of briefing charts 
7) Associated legacy data on test activity  
8) Project presentations 
9) Project managers direct interviews 
10) Technical expertise of tenured SSC personnel through direct interviews 
Although a large amount of information was readily available it could not be used in its original format.  
Intermediate databases were created to organize information and facilitate data manipulation. Figure 1 illustrates the 
process followed to capture the information needed for test cost analysis; from data gathering to ultimately test cost 
analysis.   
The project cost history information is derived from Blue Book information (hardcopy) and CDW information 
(electronic) and it was capture in a spreadsheet document. For the most part cost information from 1997 to 2001 
comes from the Blue Book; thereafter, it was obtained from CDW. The process of combining these databases was 
helpful for cross-comparing and verifying accuracy of actual cost accrual data. If available, cost information used on 
earlier analyses was included for the purpose of validating the data and the analysis performed at that time. For each 
project, the efforts performed resulted in development of a project’s monthly and cumulative profile of actual cost, 
from project inception to project closure, as of June 2005, recorded and display on a monthly timeline basis.  
Raw test specific information was provided by staff members. The information was sorted by project and by 
date.  Then it was summarized and the resulting number of tests per day, and test seconds per day was transferred to 
a timeline chart. 
Another spreadsheet document captured project schedule information extracted from the performing 
organization’s monthly review reports and official presentations to management.  To complement, schedule 
information from the SAA and/or PRD was included as part of the project schedule history. The SSA and PRD 
schedule information is planning data and it is included for both historical and comparison purposes. The schedule 
history, segregated by source and displayed on a monthly timeline, contains actual test data including how many 
tests, how many seconds, and ancillary notes as to the nature of the test activity.  
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Ultimately a project profile puts all relevant information on a single spreadsheet. This is a record and visual 
account of projects’ actual schedule, cost, and test in a monthly timeline format, all on the same chart, from 
inception to closeout.  The SAA date, or any other official agreement date, is considered the official start date of the 
project.  For all projects there is uncertainty as to the official end and closeout of the project; reason is the nature of 
costing activities which includes among all others invoices, late-billing and payments, that  could occurred many 
months after the last known test activity of the project. Review of monthly financial activity after the last known test 
activity lead us to conclude that a period of 6 months after the last known test activity is an adequate timeframe for 
considering the project closed; thus, any financial transaction performed after the 6 months period is deemed 
insignificant for the purpose of this study. Actual cost is recorded on a month-by-month basis, as well as in terms of 
cumulative cost, and percentage cumulative cost. Test activity is denoted by the numbers of tests, the total test 
seconds; and it is attributed in the month the test happened.  As an example, Fig. 2 shows an excerpt of the 
combined schedule, cost, and timeline for the 75Klbf Thrust Chamber Assembly (75K TCA) test project.  In order to  
ORIGINAL DATA SOURCE
•Agreements (SAA, MOU)
•Project Requirements Document (PRD)
•Project Presentations to Management
•Reports to Management
•Blue Book (BB)
•Cost Data Warehouse (CDW)
•Test Data
•Post-Apollo SSC propulsion test projects5
DATA EXTRACTED
•Project Identification
•Project Manager
•Charge Code
•Project Schedule
•Test Stand
•Test Activity
•Test Time
•Cost Data
•Project  Status
INTERMEDIATE DATABASE – Level 1
•Business Infrastructure (table)
•Project and Test Stand (matrix)
INTERMEDIATE DATABASES – Level 2
•Cost History per Project (timeline)
•Schedule History per Project (timeline)
•Test History per Project (table and timeline)
INTERMEDIATE DATABASES – Level 3
Project Profile. Monthly timeline depicting  
schedule, cost, and test activity
COLLATERAL DATABASE
•Agreements
•PRDs
Post-Apollo SSC 
propulsion test projects5
Project and Test Stand 
Matrix
PROPULSION TEST COST ANALYSIS
•By Project
•By Thrust Level 
•By Test Objective
•By Test Stand
 
 
Figure 1. Block diagram to illustrate test cost evaluation approach. 
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facilitate the interpretation, a graph for each project is added to the Project Profile database file as well.  Figure 5 
shows a simplified example of a graphical interpretation for the 75K TCA project.  As data permits, a variety of test 
cost evaluations and charts are added to the profile. Examples are: percent cost at different points in the test 
campaign, average cumulative cost per test, cost envelope per number of test, and so forth.   
B. Integrity of Cost Accrual Information 
As noted earlier, cost data was obtained from two sources: the Blue Book and CDW. The Blue Book is the 
original traditional monthly and year-to-date printout of financial information and given the right criteria it is 
 CY02 CY03
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4
signed SAA facility act ivat ion Cancel SSA. 75Klbf TCA Sept 2002
M IPR ($$) T/A act ivat ion No. of Tests 5
Total test seconds 31.9
M onth Cost per Test = 43.6 $k
ICD Test ing M onth Cost per Second = 6.83 $k
Baseline schedule Cum Cost per Test = 636 $k
PRD  Ph 2 & 3 Cum Cost per Second = 99.6 $k
Facility construct ion
Test Act ivity Cell
1st SAA E2 75Klbf TCA 1 3
E2 75Klbf TCA 1 2.01
E2 75Klbf TCA 1 4.4
signed SAA Test ing E2 75Klbf TCA 1 9
E2 75Klbf TCA 1 13.5
ICD
2nd SAA sched info id as EXCTCA
sched info id as 75Klbf TCA
sched info id as TRUTCA
SAA Revised IA w/ EPR Prem test plan Final tst  pln TA delivery
Funds Revised ICD Schedule baseline TA installat ion
ICD TTA / SAA PRD r0 Test period
as per Oct 01 rpt; (with EPR) CDR
a decision was made to
transit ion from E2C2 to E2C1 
schedule info from for horizontal pressure-fed
PTD Monthly Reports test ing, engine system only Team memo
schedule info from other sources CA CA CA CA CA A A A A
Jan Feb M ar Apr M ay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0
31.9
2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003
2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003
Apr M ay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb M ar Apr M ay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb M ar Apr
0 0 47 106 172 385 65 120 386 599 828 1006 1353 1690 2123 2386 2629 2841 121 124 126 128 128 137 149
0 0 47 59 66 213 66 54 157 215 229 189 315 341 439 255 315 218 121 5 2 2 0 29 12
0 0 47 106 172 385 451 505 662 877 1,106 1,295 1,610 1,951 2,390 2,645 2,960 3,178 3,298 3,303 3,305 3,307 3,307 3,336 3,348
0 0 1 3 5 12 14 15 20 26 33 39 48 58 72 79 89 95 99 99 99 99 99 100
13-Sep-02
18-Sep-02
20-Sep-02
24-Sep-02
27-Sep-02
We are in the process of 
approving new documentat ion 
for the Pressure Fed TCA test 
program
facility modif ied with a new thrust 
structure and foundation to accommodate 
the 75Klbf thrust levels of the derated 
original  TCA
CA thru 7/12/02
A started 7/15/02
tes t ing  was  success fully 
co mp leted  in Oct0 2
 
 
Figure 2. Integrated summary of key events and financial data for the 75K TCA project, as an example. 
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7 
possible to trace cost information back to project inception. NASA SSC began utilizing CDW, a major financial 
software tool, around year 2002/2003. All project financial information prior to FY 2002 was found to be a single 
initial value in CDW; thereafter, CDW information was available on a monthly basis.   
One hundred eleven (111) charge codes were indentified from different sources (e.g. presentations, management 
reports). Cost data was gathered for 84 of them. For 20 of the 84 charge codes with cost data, cost history was 
constructed by combining/comparing Blue Book information with CDW data. The remaining 64 cost histories were 
either only in the Blue Book or only in the CDW database.  
The first task in the evaluation was to compare the constructed cumulative cost (CCC) of the Blue Book database 
to the cumulative cost in the CDW database initialization. (The formula used to calculate percent difference was 
[[CCC – CDW]/CDW]). Four (4) out of 20 charge codes with constructed cost history showed a cost disparity 
greater than 5%. The second task was to examine cases with a cost credit (i.e. negative cost) for a given month. For 
a variety of reasons, financial transactions to reverse cost are performed and recorded in the financial system. Those 
transactions are not necessarily recorded against the month when the cost occurred, but the month when the 
transaction to reverse cost is made. If the total value of the reverse transaction is greater than the cost charged 
against the charge code in a given month, the resulting actual monthly cost is negative. The examination revealed 
that from Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 to June 2005, approximately half of the charge codes with cost data showed at least 
one month with negative actual cost. When grouped by projects, 88% of the projects experienced at least one month 
with a negative actual monthly cost.  In terms of cost, the absolute value of the negative actual cost was compared 
against the total cumulative cost per the information recorded in the CDW files.   One-fourth (1/4) of the charge 
codes showed a negative actual cost greater than 1% of their respective total cost. Only eight percent (8%) of the 
charge codes showed a negative actual cost greater than 5% of their respective total cost. Overall, for all the charge 
codes considered for the analysis, the total negative actual costs when compared to the total actual cost amounts to 
less than 2%. These negative costs are actually adjustments and corrections that were made to correct accounts for 
project and financial changes, fiscal year related modifications, and other such factors. Regardless, for the most part, 
the cost accrual information is believed to be reliable. 
IV. Results and Conclusions 
 The results and information presented here is a subset of what is available for discussion and evaluation within 
the Table 1 grouping, and the financial data itself spans the particular period from 1998 to 2004 for which 
sufficiently complete information is at hand. Specific test projects are presented as cases to illustrate broader 
conclusions and trends. While subject to some uncertainty due to changes in financial systems practices, there are 
several conclusions that can still be reached with confidence regarding the cost of rocket propulsion testing for 
various types of test articles and test campaigns. An inspection of the cost accrual trends for selected examples 
should therefore be instructive to those who would plan and budget for future testing campaigns for test articles that 
are similar or comparable to those in this study. 
A. Evaluation of Project Cost  
In Table 2, we list thirteen completed projects along with the number of tests and timeframes for their 
respective test campaigns; the months correspond to the actual period after testing began and thus exclude many 
months of precursor test preparations. The final cumulative cost incurred at the test site for executing that project 
from inception to closeout is shown in $K. Given in order of increasing total cost, the test projects selected for this 
table are a subset of what is listed in Table 1. In all cases except the last row in the table, the total test series costs 
include both non-recurring (all stand preparations) and recurring (active testing) costs. Note that the total value of 
the test effort is in most cases underrepresented in that the accrued cost does not include the labor provided by the 
test customer, nor does it include any test hardware (test article or test support hardware) that was provided by the 
test customer or third parties. Nevertheless it is still instructive to examine the costs that are accrued as such. 
In general, it is expected that the test project cost is driven by scale of both the test article and test stand, the 
actual test complexity (hardware, software, test specifics, and more), and the expectations of the test customer 
regarding its conduct. The examples in Table 2 include small, medium, and large scale test articles/stands. The 
smallest test articles were the pressure-fed catalyst bed gas generators utilizing a single propellant, hydrogen 
peroxide. Thrust-scale for the catalyst bed chambers is well under 1000 lbf. Mid-size test articles include pressure-
fed thrust chambers such as a 75K TCA and LOX-fed and peroxide-fed hybrid motors. The larger test articles 
mentioned included a 200K and 250K scale LOX/LH engines, and the largest being the LOX/LH 700Klbf  thrust-
scale engine. The engine pumps and powerhead devices were precursor tests to the 250K engine system test, and 
therefore of 250Klbf thrust-scale. All the examples shown are for R&D test projects, except for the 700K LOX/LH  
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engine which over the four years was performing flight certification test series on a single test stand. For the five 
years shown in Table 2, the numbers of tests were 19, 72, 21, 16, and 6 respectively. The approximate periods of all 
the project test campaigns are given for reference, where the actual active testing period (months) is typically a small 
fraction (one-fifth or less) of the multiple years over which the test project was authorized and executed in terms of 
its formulate-design-build-operate-demobilize life cycle. Overall, this information set spans almost three (3) orders 
of magnitude in terms of cost and in terms of the thrust-scale of the test articles. 
Several observations are noteworthy within this table. A test article such as for the catalyst bed evaluation test 
series can undergo a large number of tests (418 in this case) in a relatively short time frame due to its small size and 
relative simplicity. In fact, on most test days several tests were performed daily for several days with scheduled 
pauses for data reviews. The number of tests in and of itself is not necessarily a figure of merit. Often simply having 
a successful test series, even with few tests, is deemed a major success if the hardware design is found to be 
adequate and hence mitigates design and development risk through early demonstration testing. This was indeed the 
case with the 75K TCA test series that involved only 5 fully successful tests of a derated heritage engine TCA that 
was to be fitted onto a simple stage to become a DOD target missile for intercept experiments. Further, for hybrid 
motors such as the 250Klbf hybrid (liquid cryogenic propellant injected into a solid fuel grain), only a few tests are 
needed to demonstrate the motor design, and hence only 4 hotfire tests were conducted of this large scale motor. 
 The case of the 700K engine test series is unique in the table, being the only one for a production flight engine. 
Analogous to the space shuttle main engine, which has occupied SSC test stands for decades (1976-2009), the 700K 
engine occupies its own test position/stand for multiple years to support the vehicle flight manifest. Thus tests are 
performed at the rate of 10 to 25 tests per year with an appropriately allocated budget; for the years shown in Table 
2, this budget was approximately $20M per year since non-recurring costs had been incurred in prior years. 
The case of 250K-scale LOX pump and LH pumps are also unique in that they are the only pump test series 
represented in Table 2. Rocket engine pump standalone testing may be more complex than thrust chamber testing 
given the hazards of cryogenic propellants being handled at low feed pressure and high discharge pressure, along 
with high flowrate and pressure turbine drive gases, and very carefully executed start and shutdown transients. Thus 
pump testing will often be more costly than testing other combustion devices. When a pump is hot-fired, it is 
typically a more challenging and expensive test series since two combustion devices are involved, the pump itself 
and the driving preburner or gas generator. A similarly complex test project was the Aerospike engine testing, where 
 
Table 2. Test projects sorted by total costs accrued. 
 
Test Project Name 
 
Total Project 
Cost ($K) 
 
Number 
of Tests Test Campaign Timeframe* 
10K LOX Hybrid 231 4 Dec 03 & May 04, Aug 04 
H2O2 Catbed 544 418 Dec. 00, Jun 01, Nov 01-Jan 02 
250K LOX Hybrid 1,055 4 Jul-Aug 99, & Jan 02 
H2O2 Hybrid 1,512 26 Jan 00 - Mar 01 
60K LOX Hybrid (stage) 1,882 3 Jul 00 - Sept 00 
30K Preburner (subscale) 2,395 5 Sept 03 - Dec 03 
75K TCA 3,336 5 Sept 02 - Oct 02 
250K-scale LH2 Pump 5,424 16 Feb 03 - Nov 03 
650K TCA 6,123 16 Jun 00 - Sept 00 
200K LOX/LH Powerpack 10,300 17 Oct 99 - Sep 00 
200K LOX/LH Engine 12,300 18** Oct 99 – May 00 & Jul-Aug 01 
650K LOX/LH Stage 10,698 9 Jan 01 - May 01 
250K LOX P/PB/Pwrhd 13,611 22 May-Nov 01, Sep-Oct 02, Mar-Jun 03 
650K LOX.LH Engine 81,471 134 Jun 00 - Aug 04 
*Period of active testing (excludes buildup).      **Only 3 tests were dual-engine version. 
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a single engine test actually involved 10 simultaneously operating small combustors exhausting to a common 
nozzle, and the analogous dual-engine engine involved 20 combustors being fed from two sets of turbo machinery. 
The total cost of $20.6M was thus approximately split between the precursor Powerpack testing and the engine 
testing according to this cost history. 
Projects with stand alone single-test-series include the 75K TCA, Peroxide Catbet, 650K TCA, 10K LOX 
Hybrid, 250K Hybrid, and the 30K subscale preburner as well (once the follow-on main chamber was cancelled). 
Projects with multiphase test series are all the remaining test projects shown in Table 2. 
A trend may be discerned from the same information if presented graphically as in Fig. 3 with respect to thrust-
scale
‡
. Clearly, the higher the thrust level the greater the cost of the test project. The experience up to approximately 
2004 is thus captured in this graphic and can be used as a very approximate guide to anticipate testing costs. Such a 
trend is also noted from a large amount of bottoms up cost estimates summarized in prior work
9
. The documentation 
of actual costs is always beneficial, even if somewhat imperfect or incomplete, in order to provide a basis for 
comparison with future estimates of similar scope.  
It is important to further describe the nature of cost estimates and cost drivers. Figure 4 depicts in simplified 
fashion a breakdown of cost estimates into selected subparts. Three primary components of test project costs are:  
1) test facility condition at the time the test project was assigned to the facility and the amount of refurbishment 
and upgrades needed,  
                                                          
‡
The term “thrust-scale” is preferable to just “thrust” in discussing the trends since; for example, a rocket engine pump for a 
250Klbf engine would be sized for that engine but would only produce a much smaller amount of pure thrust (say 40Klbf).  
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Figure 3. Correlation of test project with thrust-scale. 
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2) project-specific modifications to the test facility in order to accommodate test project requirements and test 
objectives, and  
3) number of tests, and test duration (in terms of seconds or minutes of hotfire time) . 
The second and third items are always attributed to the test project, particularly when the test customer is 
external to NASA. The first item, refurbishment and upgrades, may be cost-shared between the testing organization 
and the NASA customer or in fact be covered entirely by one of the parties as a strategic improvement to the test 
stand capability. In the case of Table 2 test projects, the total costs (generally) include all three aspects of the total 
cost since this is a better measure of the total amount of work that was performed to achieve the test project results. 
Several caveats should be mentioned regarding Table 2. First, the costs are reported as they were accrued and 
collected without any adjustment for inflation. It would be possible to put them on the same baseline financial year 
if needed; however, these observations are not changed by cost escalation factors. Second, the test projects staffing 
(design, build and test crews) typically include a time-varying mix of civil servants and support contractors 
(sometimes predominantly contractor, and sometimes largely civil servants). The overall costs are influenced by the 
staffing model, but this is not taken into account in presenting this cost information. At this time, it is not possible to 
recover the exact staffing model for all the above test projects. Third, the test projects shown in Table 1 and 2 were 
performed for either NASA or external customers, and were estimated to somewhat different cost recovery 
guidelines per organizational policy and procedures. Such distinctions are not delved into here nor is the data 
adjusted for the unique arrangements, that occasionally included in-kind assistance (and/or test-specific hardware) 
provided by the test customers.   
The contributions to the test costs (as enumerated in Sec. IIB) may vary by project, in terms of the fraction of cost 
going to labor, materials, design, propellants, and so forth. There are some aspects of the overall distribution of costs 
that we believe are essentially universal to all test projects. This is illustrated in Fig. 4. The graphic illustrates that 
given the two major inputs, specific test objectives and test stand initial condition, the factors which drive total test 
campaign cost are 1) a fixed cost component (non-recurring) needed to get to first test, and 2) a variable cost 
component (recurring) that continues to accrue for as long as the test campaign goes on. A given test customer 
implicitly chooses the extent of upgrades/modifications to be made to the stand mostly up front by specifying the 
necessary test objectives to be met in conducting the test campaign. The test customer also later chooses the amount 
of variable (recurring) costs, once the test preparations are complete and final test approach/sequence have been 
established in a way that largely meets objectives within evolving budget constraints, Figure 4 simplifies a very 
dynamic and interactive process between test customer and test provider, yet serves a reasonable pedagogical model 
for future test planning.  
 
Figure 4. Propulsion tests projects cost components. 
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B. Representative stand alone single-test-series project (75K TCA) 
In order to better describe the expenditure profile and totals discussed above, the 75K TCA test project is offered 
as a representative case for illustrating test project life cycle costs.
9
  (Refer to Fig. 2 and Fig. 5) This expenditure 
profile shows a project’s actual schedule, cost, and test in a monthly timeline format, on the single chart.  The details 
of the test project were discussed earlier in Fig. 2. The customer agreement date (SAA in this case, along with an AF 
MIPR) is considered the official start date of the project.  In its absence, any other official document, like the PRD, 
is used as reference point to mark the start of the project. For all projects there is uncertainty as to the official end 
and closure of the project. One reason is continued cost accrual activity, which could go on and on for months after 
the last known test of the project.  For purposes of putting together the profile for each project, six (6) months after 
the last known test is considered the end of the test project. Actual cost data comes from the previously discussed 
Blue Book and CDW data sources, and is graphed in Fig. 5 month by month in terms of actual and monthly accruals 
(left axis) and per cent of final cost (right axis). 
For this test project, the first official agreement was signed in May 2001 (Refer to Fig. 2), but was later 
cancelled in November 2001 to be supplanted by a revised one signed the same month. Interestingly, the change was 
to move the test article from one test stand as a vertical stage test to another stand for horizontal pressured-fed 
testing engine system only. A problem with the readiness of the stage tanks led to this unexpected situation, 
relatively early in the effort. At this point, the project has expended over $505,000, equivalent to 15% of its final 
total cost. Modifications to the test facility, in order to accommodate TA characteristics and meet test campaign 
requirements for the thrust chamber only testing, were done by July 2002, at which time facility activation 
commenced. At this point the project had consumed over 75% of the total project cost. Two months later, test 
campaign was completed, consisting of five (5) successful test runs for a total of 31.9 seconds. The most intensive 
period of activity is actually the months prior to beginning of testing, and this is typical for the test projects reported 
in this study. For 75K TCA, although more tests were originally planned, all essential test objectives had been 
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Figure 5. Cost accrual profile for the LR89 chamber. 
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achieved by the fifth test, thus obviating the need for the five remaining planned tests. By the end of the month/test 
campaign, the project had expended 95% of the total project cost.  Ultimately, the 75K TCA test project involved 17 
months to go from the first official agreement to the end of the test with a total cost accrual of $3.34M. Note that the 
cost of testing here may be said to be $0.67M per test in light of the total cost state above. This value however must 
be viewed in the context that 80-90% of the costs were non-recurring costs, before a single test point had been 
achieved. Notably, this particular project fully met its intended scope within negotiated schedule and within its 
negotiated budget. The complexity of this test project was perhaps in the “median or somewhat less” with respect to 
others in the group of projects shown in Table 1 and 2. 
C. Representative multiphase test series project (250K LOX/LH staged combustion engine R&D) 
Whereas the case of the 75K TCA involved a single test article with a single test campaign, the 250K engine 
development testing involved testing multiple combustion devices in various configurations in building block 
fashion over a multi-year period from 2000 to 2004. This case is instructive because it comprises multiple test 
campaigns towards a single objective of advancing staged-combustion engine technology. At NASA SSC, there 
were in fact three distinct test articles and the associated test series that were tracked in organizational cost accounts 
for the oxidizer side development and the fuel side development testing, namely the 1) LOX pump cold-flow test 
series along with its LOX-rich Preburner and pump/preburner combined hot-fire test series, and, 2) the fuel pump 
cold-flow test series. The active testing periods are shown in Table 2 for both. The end-objective was risk reduction 
for the engine test series with all the test articles combined (including a fuel-side Preburner tested at Aerojet 
facilities in a separate effort). The LOX-side test series involved three phases for the pump, Preburner and finally 
combined hot-fire series totaling over $13.6M upon completion. By contrast, the LH pump only cold-flow test series 
cost $5.4M additional.  
Notably, these multiple component testing series were followed by a complete demonstration powerhead 
featuring everything except the engine nozzle. It is difficult to separate the test efforts by test article since they 
occupied the same test stand and shared design and operations crews in their individual test project life cycles. To 
the extent that the fuel pump test series was relatively distinct from the LOX pump testing, it can be said that $5.4M 
was the cost to obtain the technical data from the 6 test points. Multiple attempts (16) were required to achieve these 
6 six fuel pump test points, and hence the cost per test could be said to be $0.9M per test. 
At first glance this may seem an exorbitant price for a single test condition for a 250Klbf scale pump, and 
doubling the number of tests would half the cost per test. This circumstance however is better understood in the 
context of the overall objective. Given the lack of spare hardware, and cost and schedule targets for completion, it 
was deemed sufficient (by the test customer) to demonstrate the pump with these six tests in order to proceed 
expeditiously to the complete powerhead demonstration test series with both preburners, both pumps, and a yet 
untested main combustion chamber still to come. 
D. Recommendation 
With this survey of past R&D testing costs, and its challenges, the following improvements are suggested for 
capturing cost of current and future rocket testing. First and foremost, an improved methodology for capturing the 
cost elements of any given test project is required. This includes labor and materials cost throughout the project’s 
life cycle as well as its consumables usage. To a large extent, NASA SSC has greatly improved methods to capture 
costs through improved financial systems implemented since 2004. One of the nuances of truly capturing all costs is 
in defining which costs are to be counted as part of the project and which are not, and maintaining consistency in 
this regard. (Testing involves not only the test buildup and operations activity but also independent safety reviews, 
special customer review, and costs to access a wide range of the test site’s infrastructure facilities and capabilities on 
demand).  
Further, another major improvement is possible if the capture and archival of cost information is undergirded by 
information about the business model, so to speak, that was in conducting a given test project. In particular, projects 
can have assigned personnel that may be part of the cadre of core competency personnel retained by the Agency for 
corporate memory, at essentially no direct charge to specific test customers. Accounting for such NASA in-kind 
support, and customer-provided in-kind support, to the project will also better define the overall cost of testing a 
given test article. 
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V. Closing Remarks 
 
The data presented here on test project cost ranges over three orders of magnitude, from $0.5M to over $10M, 
and is examined to better understand testing cost accrual trends at the NASA SSC test facility and potentially other 
comparable test facilities. In the aggregate the information shows that the test campaign duration itself is generally a 
small fraction of overall test project life cycle, and that the majority of testing funds are expended in test facility 
detailed preparations and not the actual testing period. Not surprisingly, test article complexity drives test costs, as 
well as the engine thrust-scale. The absolute value of the testing costs for the R&D test examples of this paper are 
useful as benchmarks for future testing being planned, however, users of the information should be aware that the 
costs from the test site under represent the total value of effort which typically has significant support from the test 
article customer personnel and hardware also.  
Given such a wide variety of testing, it is unlikely that a single menu of testing costs is practical, even if it is 
possible. Efforts can be made to categorize the ranges of test costs in terms of scale, and type of test article, 
however, even sophisticated multivariate correlations will likely fall subject to the variations in market driven costs 
of material and labor and customer-driven test approaches. The very nature of R&D testing inherently involves 
unknowns about the test article and its risk factors, thus driving conservative test approaches to mitigate risk, which 
in turn affect costs.  
Overall, directly applicable experience is the strongest factor in being able to safely conduct a test project and 
then being able to budget the appropriate amount of schedule and cost for it. Most test customers will have a limited 
range of information to rely upon with which to budget testing costs and schedules, so the present information set 
(albeit limited) is provided for the benefit of those who may need such information as a benchmark or guide.  
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